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Why doesn’t the UN do what we tell them to?
  I have been wondering  if our  (the wider  interested
development  community)  remonstrations  with  UN
agencies over how they could improve their projects
have  simply  fallen  on  deaf  ears.  We  have  found
these  new  approaches  to  measuring  impact  –
randomised control trials or community participation
–  that would  revolutionize  the way  they operated  if




When  I  began  my  masters  at  LSE,  I  saw  the
problem  of  development  as  one  of  reallocation.
There are people  living on  less  than $1 a day and
people  living on significantly more and  the problem
is  to  rebalance  the  scales.  In  the  course  of  my
studies,  I  became  more  interested  in  how  well











for  employees  within  UN  agencies  or  charities  to  avoid  rigorous  monitoring.  Was  high  quality
measurement restricted by:
Lack of knowledge: Were evaluators simply unaware of how to improve impact assessments?
Over-claiming: Did project staff fudge reporting to project budgets and jobs? Was there, for example,
pressure to sell positive stories to management or donors?
Complexity: Were projects too complex to measure well? Projects which rely on many interrelated
factors?
Laziness: If projects were difficult to measure, how did that affect morale? Did it sap enthusiasm for
efforts to improve monitoring?
To  answer  these  questions  I  chose  to  make  a  case  study  of  the  Food  and  Agriculture
Organisation,  the UN agency with  the mandate  to  improve global agricultural productivity with a
budget of $2.4bn. In particular, I worked with the Fisheries Department and investigated a recent
evaluation  of  the  impact  of  projects  associated with  the FAO Code of Conduct  for Responsible
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project  staff  descriptions  of  the  constraints  to  improved  monitoring  and  interviewee  comments
showed  that several were sceptical of  the ability of managers and evaluators  to measure  those
complex projects effectively.
Project  staff  had  mixed  incentives:    in  theory,  they  supported  the  idea  that  performance
measurement  would  ensure  projects  worked  well  but  they  also  feared  that,  in  the  short  term,
baseline data collection would crowd out time used in delivery.
It  is not enough  to assume  that  charity and multilateral agencies will  act  in  their own  long  term
interests  if  their  short  term  interests  are  in  contradiction.  Campaigns  to  improve  measurement
within  large UN agencies and charities need  to  factor  in  the  incentives of workers  if  they are  to
affect  beneficiaries.  Otherwise,  development  agencies  will  be  left  looking  both  ways  on  impact
assessment, saying ‘yes’ but meaning ‘no’.
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